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Abstract. We review market participants' actions and the EU afterthe introduction of the 
euro and during the crises period and Brexit process. The crucial factor is the feedback 
effect in the reactions of the market participants and the EU. The euro was introduced in a 
compromised monetary union agreement, essentially underlining the European integrative 
process issues that were highlighted by the euro crises. Hence, for this reason, it is hard to 
explain the euro crises without referencing the European integration theories. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to understate the behavioural factors, including greed and fear, in the 
full explanation of thecrises. At the heart of this research is the introduction of a new model 
of testing the stability of the market extending the variance bound test of (Fakhry & 
Richter, 2015) underpinned by a Markov Switching GARCH model. We analyse the 
stability of the Euro FX Market from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 2019. We found a 
mixture of over and under reactions defining the three sub-periods which given the Euro 
heuristic influencing both the market participants’ and EU’s views seem to be an acceptable 
result. 
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1. Introduction 
he euro's introduction was probably one of the most significant 
financial events of the last 50 years. Moreover, at its heart lays an 
influencing concept underpinning the EU integrative process. As 
stated by Schmitter, (2005), the main objective of scholars such as Ernst 
Haas and Stanley Hoffmann was how to conceive a process of European 
integration to eliminate the horrors of the two world wars. The two grand 
theories of EU integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism 
derived by Haas, (1958) and Hoffmann, (1966) respectively, were aimed at 
European unity in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, in its early 
manifestations, neofunctionalism was an attempt at theorizing the 
foundation of post-war European unity as noted by Rosamond, (2000). On 
the other hand, postfunctionalism was introduced by Hooghe & Marks, 
(2009) to explain the disruptive nature of a clash between functional 
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pressures and national identity in the European integration process in 
recent years.  
The global financial and Eurozone sovereign debt crises highlighted the 
issues at the heart of European integration, emphasising the incomplete 
and compromised European monetary union (aka EMU). Hence in this 
paper, we evaluate the three grand theories of European integration to the 
crises and Brexit. Since Brexit is seen as a crossroad in the European 
integration process with others, such as Italy, waiting on the Brexit deal. 
Brexit could prove to be the catalyst to a fully integrative EU or the 
disintegration of the EU. However, since our research is about the 
Eurozone and the Euro FX market; it is not enough to evaluate the 
European integration process during the observed periods. Since, in 
essence, the investors/EU actions feedback is the key to explaining the 
crises and Brexit. Hence, we use the behavioural finance theory influenced 
by the seminal articles Tversky & Kahneman, (1974) and Kahneman & 
Tversky, (1979) to evaluate the actions of the market participants during the 
crises and Brexit process. 
Thus, one crucial contribution is using European integration theories 
and behavioural finance to evaluate the crises in the Eurozone and Brexit 
process. We believe there are no papers written with a comprehensive 
evaluation of the EU's actions and market participants during the Eurozone 
crises and Brexit process in the Eurozone financial market. Another 
essential contribution is the introduction of a stability model with an 
emphasis on market participants' reaction. The model derived from the 
variance bound test of  Fakhry & Richter, (2015) uses a Markov Switching 
GARCH model, which illustrates the differing reactions of market 
participants in the Euro FX market since the introduction of the euro until 
31st December 2019. 
Our findings suggest only by combining the explanatory powers of the 
EU integration theories with behavioural finance that a full picture of the 
crises and Brexit impact on the financial market could emerge. Damningly, 
the evaluation signalled too often the EU's actions were the results of 
reacting to the market participants and did not adequately address the 
issues at the heart of the crises. These issues included the lack of an 
available macroeconomic adjustment and fiscal policy to deal with the 
crisis and the incomplete and compromised monetary union at the heart of 
the Euro. Also, the market participants' reaction bore the whole mark of the 
opposite scale behaviours: greed and fear. Moreover, at the heart of 
explaining the Eurozone crises lay the fundamental truth that market 
participants were taken by the Euro heuristic factor as identified by 
Szyszka, (2013). Additionally, our stability model results illustrated the 
changing behaviour of the Euro FX market during the crises and, in 
particular, Brexit. The results seem to confirm the Euro FX Market trend, 
given the euro's strong impression during the observed periods. 
However, further research is needed to confirm the validity of our 
model. One possible study is to analyse for different markets. Another 
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possible route is to use other Markov Switching Garchmodels like the 
Markov switching EGARCH model Henry, (2009) to include the 
asymmetrical effect. 
The rest of this paper consists offour sections: literature review, 
methodology, empirical evidence, and conclusion. The literature review 
contains the evaluations of European integration and behavioural finance 
theories during the crises and Brexit.  
  
2. Literature review 
It is essential to note that the European monetary union and euro's 
introduction underlinedthe relevancy of financial markets to the EU 
integration process. Thus, EU integration's critical advanceshave not been 
political or fiscal integrations, but market integration over the last few 
decades. Conversely, as stated by Bekaert et al., (2013), the EU's goal has 
always been full economic and, more importantly, to this research, financial 
integration. Furthermore, as hinted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), 
financialintegration was thought to be more acceptable and politically less 
sensitiveto member states than core political powers such as fiscal policies. 
Since, according to Gali & Perotti, (2003) fiscal integration was regarded as 
unnecessary and a harmful “straitjacket” on national fiscal policies. The 
fear is that fiscal integration would create a vacuum where the need to react 
to a national recession would lead a clash with the limits imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Thus, leading to a procyclical fiscal policy and 
amplifying the economic fluctuation among Eurozone countries. Moreover, 
financial integration is a market rather than a supranational induced 
process, especially in the equity markets and banking sector with the 
merger of many organisations across borders. Even though this was the 
result of a spillover effect from the euro and EMU integration process. 
A critical factor in any integrative process is the stability in the economy 
and financial markets. Crucially, the much-criticised Stability and Growth 
Pact was to prove a stable environment to the monetary union and 
consequently to the financial market and economy. However, as 
highlighted by Fakhry, (2019a) and Fakhry, (2019b), the global financial 
crisis and ensuing euro crises and to a lesser extent Brexit process 
underlined the issues of the Stability and Growth Pact. Additionally, these 
events highlighted the fragile stability of the financial market. Conversely 
as stated by Bernard Baruch and Bertrand Russell: 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events 
themselves but the human reactions to those events.” 
“Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act 
humanly or think sanely under the influence of fear”. 
These two statements were relevant during the crises period; hinting at 
the need for behavioural finance to explain the market participants' 
psychological mindset in response to the crises and the EU reactions. 
However, a crucial factor in understanding the EU reaction is the 
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integrative process; this means analysing the three primary schools of EU 
integration during the crises:  
 Neofunctionalism as derived by Haas, (1958) 
 Intergovernmentalism as originally derived by Hoffmann, (1966); 
subsequently extended to liberal intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik, 
(1993) 
 Postfunctionalism identified by Marks & Hooghe over several 
seminal papers including Hooghe & Marks, (2009) 
This literature review will be sub-categorised into two sections; the first 
section will review the EU's actions via the three integration schools. The 
second section will review the behavioural explanation of the crisis on the 
EU financial markets. 
 
2.1. A review of European integration during the crises 
Schimmelfennig, (2017) defines a crisis in European integration as a 
situation where the decision-making process could and often manifests into 
a threat leading to a significant disintegration probability. Whereby 
disintegration is the reduction of the current level, scope and membership 
of integration. Simply put, an integration crisis is one which could threaten 
the extent of pooling and delegation, EU policy competences or member 
states exiting. This definition was at the heart of thecrises within the EU 
during the last few years. Furthermore, crises are open-ended events that 
may result in disintegration, the status quo's reassertion, or further 
integration. In essence, capturing the essence of a decision-based crisis 
cycle: spill-back, encapsulation and spillover leading to positive, negative 
or stable changes in the integration process.    
 
Table 1. Integration Theories General Explanation of Crises  































Source: Schimmelfennig (2017). 
 
According to Schimmelfennig, (2017), in its most general 
conceptualisation, an explanation of a crisis generates a deviated response 
from all three prevailingintegration theories. As illustrated by Table 1, there 
are varied differences in all categories of an integrated crisis, highlighting 
each theory's underlining assumptions. These differences range from the 
explanation of the crisis to the eventual outcome. Depending on the theory; 
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the outcome could be disintegration or further integration. In summarising, 
the three theories agree with the importance of crises to the catalyst of 
theoretical and observational European integration changes. However, they 
disagree with the source, processes and effects of the crises on the 
integration process. 
  
2.2. The Euro crisis 
It is worth remembering that the euro crises resulted from a perfect 
storm starting with the subprime crisis in the US and developing into a 
global financial crisis enveloping the global financial and banking sectors. 
This episode had the devastating impact of spilling over into a debt crisis 
involving several Eurozone member states. Conversely, impacting the Euro 
and EMU policies' stability putting into question the membership of some 
states and the whole European integration process. Moreover, according to 
Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018); the crisesraised several unsolved issues 
regarding the integration process: 
 Why was there a high level of domestic politicisation? 
 Whywas there an intractable distributive implication to the crisis? 
 Why was there not an increase in differentiated integration? 
 Why did the EU rely on extensive external actors? 
As illustrated by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), the principal 
explanation of these issues lies in distinguishing between market and core 
state power integrations. At the heart of this distinction are three similar 
assumptions made by the two fundamental theories of EU integration, 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism: 
1. Interdependence increases integration: in essence, both externalities 
and spillover effects are mostly triggered by interdependent in sector-
specific elements. Thus, implying a collective benefit in integrating these 
elements under a supranational policy coordination to EU members states. 
Therefore, this integration process is the institutional definition of collective 
power-solving within the complex conditions of interdependence. 
2. The harmonisation of national rules and regulations is key to the 
supply route of the integration process. Conversely, the delegation process 
to supranational bodies is limited to supporting regulatory integration via 
centralised monitoring, enforcement and adjudication. It is essential to note 
that the EU is not a positive state but a regulatory state. 
3. Political supply is not automotive; this is due to distributive 
conflicts between member states’ governments impeding the agreement of 
common European rules. Nevertheless, both neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism stipulate that member states resolve differences 
efficiently and within EU regulations' bounds. Neofunctionalism dictates 
that an upgrade of common interests can manage conflicts while liberal 
intergovernmentalism emphasises the resolution of disputes via 
distributive bargaining. 
Central to the crisis is the supply differentiation between market 
integration and political (i.e. the core state power functions) integration. As 
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observed by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), both neofunctionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism were derived to explain market integration. 
Since market integration is the liberalisation of trade and incorporation of 
regulation across the EU, it may benefit all member states. Moreover, any 
disagreement between member states over regulations may be overcome 
based onthe most significant common multiple. Thus, resolving conflicts by 
upgrading common interests and power-based distributive bargaining. 
As hinted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), political integration is an 
entirely different type of beast. Moreover, the functional optimism of both 
theories become increasingly marginalised. Since political integration 
involved the turnover of core state powers (such as defence, fiscal, 
monetary, policing) to the EU, this suddenly becomes an invasion of 
national state affairs. Thus, leading to a misconception aboutoverall 
governance and resentment from the nation-states leading to nationalist or 
Eurosceptics taking advantage. However, central to the political integration 
issue are two key factors: unlike markets, core state powers have limited 
resources, and hence the distributive conflicts involved tend to be more 
pronounced. Thus, leaving little room for conflict resolution by upgraded 
common interest or power-based distributive bargaining. 
Moreover, regulation is less effective in integrating core state power due 
to compliance cost falling only on the member states. Thus, meaning 
compliance is a matter of ability rather than willingness. Conversely, 
political integration could magnify the exogenous shocks or amplify the 
asymmetric interdependencies leading to endogenous shocks. Therefore, 
the integration of core state powers needs to be backed by burden-sharing 
at the European level to reduce excessive risk on member states. Of 
noteworthy is just because there are difficulties in the supply of political 
integration does not mean there is no demand for it. However, this demand 
was met by inadequate supply before and during the crises. 
As outlined by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), since the mid-1950s, EU 
policy haspreferred market function integration due to not requiring 
political functions integration. However, with the increasing market 
integration activities in the 1990s; there was increasing functional spillover 
pressures into monetary and fiscal policies. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), the member states refused to have these 
fundamental core state powers integrated under the European Union. 
Hence the European Union opted to regulation integration and horizontal 
differentiation. Conversely, monetaryintegrationcame into EU regulations 
with the European Monetary Union's introduction in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992. 
The EMUwas a compromise of the power-based distributive bargaining 
and upgrading of common interest methods. The creation of the ECB to 
take over monetary policies; however, as argued by Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, (2018), due to member states objections, there were 
restrictions on EMU policies and ECB actions; in effect, these restrictions 
denied the ECB the power to act as a lender of last resort to governments: 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
B. Fakhry, 8(1), 2021, p.1-42. 
7 
7 
 Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) prohibits monetary financing of public debts. 
 Article 125 of the TFEU prohibits fiscal debt sharing with member 
states or the EU institutions; this means no bailouts. 
 Article 127 of the TFEU restricts the ECB mandates in the 
maintenance of price stability.  
As hinted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), EMUwas achieved thru 
horizontal differentiation, mainly due to countries not willing or able to 
participate in such policies. A prime example is the UK opting out of the 
EMU policies because the national actors did not have the political or mass 
support. Another reason is the inability to participatebecausethe entry 
standards wereprohibitingor the member state felt it was unable to do so 
for reasons other than political or support from national actors. Moreover, 
the focus on regulations integration instead of core functionalintegration 
did help to overcome the issue of domestic politicisation.  
As pointed by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), a major contributory 
factor to the Eurozone crises was low compliance with the regulations as 
evidenced in the excessive deficit or debt of a large proportion of the 
Eurozone member states in diffidence of the Stability and Growth Pact.  
Moreover, according to Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), there are three 
possible explanation as to the low compliance: 
 the cost of full compliance fell solely on each member state 
 many regulatory gaps in the Stability and Growth Pact  
 insufficient burden and risk-sharing 
As hinted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), at the heart of the 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism theories is a simple 
truth that integration is the efficient collective responseto a common 
European problem. The problem is that the EMU was notgenuinely 
efficient and collective as proved by the crises. In essence, the EMU project 
created as many problems as it solved. As listed by Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, (2018), the EU has come up with several possible scenarios 
for the future path of integration: 
 “carry on”, this implies an ad-hoc problem-solving unreformed EU.  
However, as recent events have proven this is a risk riddled scenario 
 unwind back to the Single market integration policy, thus dropping 
all attempts at core-power integration and abandoning the EMU and 
Schengen projects. This option would contain some unforeseen and 
unknown issues; hence it is deemed to be too costly even for crisis-hit 
members such as Greece 
 increased horizontal differentiational integration whereby unwilling 
or unable member states opt or forced to opt-out of further integration of 
state core powers. This option contains no understanding of the solutions 
to existing problems. Moreover, it would need an increased willingness by 
the “able” to show a multilateral solidarity.  
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 “doing less more efficiently” implies the EU focusing on a few 
essential functions and, more importantly, getting involved in regulating 
these functions. 
 Increase full integration for all member states. The fear is that this 
may leadto an anticipation of a type of federal integration.  
As noted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018), a lesson from historical 
federation buildings is that the integration of central functions key to the 
survival of the EU, in the long run, is a challenging, long and conflictual 
process. 
As argued by Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), the incomplete 
piecemeal approach to the crisis presented two intertwined puzzles. The 
first is that at the start of the Euro crises, the leaders acknowledged that 
such an approach would be inadequate. The second is the tendency for 
every step in this piecemeal approach to integrate the EU further rather 
than disintegrate. As a result, “failing forward” by the constant policy of 
responding to failures of incremental reform of EU with new piecemeal 
reform for deeper integration. Providing answers to this intertwined puzzle 
means analysing both the intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
approaches. The key argument here is that each school addresses a specific 
issue within this puzzle; intergovernmentalism captures the dynamism 
within the critical junctures, whereas neofunctionalism defines the 
mechanism underpinning links between one critical juncture and the next. 
The fusion of these two schools would present a complete picture of the 
EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis, thus explaining the fail forward 
pattern in EU integration.  
As argued by Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), initially the governance 
structure of the Eurozone had three crucial factors missing to succeed over 
the long term: 
 Fiscal policy 
 Macroeconomic adjustment policies 
 Banking regulations 
Many leading policymakers and academics recognised the issues of 
limited governance within the Eurozone. Essentially, as the European 
Commission president Romano Prodi prophesied in the Financial Times in 
December 2001: 
“I am sure the euro will oblige us to introduce a new set of economic 
policy instruments. It is politically impossible to propose that now. 
But someday there will be a crisis and new instruments will be 
created.”  
According to Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), the inadequate policies 
underpinning EMU planted the euro crises' seeds. Moreover, at the heart of 
this inadequacy was the lowest common denominator policy facilitated by 
the intergovernmental bargaining process. For domestic politicalreasons, 
the national leaders could not agree to a fully integrated monetary/fiscal 
union under an EU supranational actor. Thus, providing emphasis to the 
neofunctionalism spillover approach due to the incompleteness of EMU. 
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Furthermore, as statedabove in Romano Prodi's quote, many of the 
supranational actors knew that EMU was incomplete; therefore, as 
neofunctionalism argues the societal actors inevitably would create 
pressures for a deepening of integration.  
As explained by Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), the euro crises' 
responses bore the hallmark of failing forward to integration. The key to 
understanding the EU's reactionsduring the euro crises is inliberal 
intergovernmentalism, over the short term, and neofunctionalism, over the 
long term. In the short term, the leaders' response to each stage of the crisis 
was dictated by the liberal intergovernmentalism bargaining approach 
which only resulted in the lowest common denominator solutions meaning 
a piecemeal fix to the EMU issues. In the long term, as argued by 
neofunctionalism, this led to a further spillover to other policy areas to 
fixissues neglected by the previous fix. Therefore, giving rise to additional 
pressures by the societal actors towards the deepening of EU integration. 
With each response to an event during the crisis, the EU members were 
ever so slowly failing towards integration. 
In truth, the euro crises had its origins in the global financial crisis, 
which started in mid-2007 with the sub-prime crisis in the US2. Conversely, 
as pointed by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), all three integration schools had 
different explanations for the euro crises. Hence, the crisis was: a case of 
iterated intergovernmental bargaining, a crisis that extended integration 
and the constraining effects of politicisation. 
2.2.1. The liberaliIntergovernmentalism explanation 
Firstly, the intergovernmentalism account for the euro crises. As 
suggested by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), the euro crises had several features 
which could be explained by intergovernmentalism. The threat to the 
existence of the Eurozone was vast and immediate. Moreover, the EU did 
not have the financial resources and legality to intervene as the lender of 
last resort. Hence the solution was in the intergovernmental bargaining 
between the member states. The threat of the crisis to the Eurozone's 
existent throughout the late 2000s to mid-2010s ensured a lengthy and 
iterated intergovernmental negotiation characterized by substantial 
interdependence and sharp asymmetries. The resulting series of lowest 
common denominator deals constrained by the diverged preferences on the 
distribution of costs did just enough to avert the Eurozone's dissolution. 
Conversely, minimizing the immediate cost to the northern states in the 
dominant bargaining position. 
As Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, (2012) states that liberal 
intergovernmentalism predicts that the risk of catastrophe would unite all 
sides of the EU to avoid the immediate costs of default. There were high 
external and internal macroeconomic risks associated with leaving the euro 
for the southern countries at risk from the high debt. For the more 
prosperousnorthern countries, the euro's breakup would have meant 
 
2 see Brunnermeier, (2009); Caballero & Krishnamurthy, (2009); Masood, (2009). 
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currency appreciation and thus loss of trade. Moreover, liberal 
intergovernmentalism predicts that the varying motives dictate the major 
intergovernmental coalitions in the bargaining process. Hence, the less 
prosperous south pushed for a Europeanised solution, while the richer 
north demanded the crises countries push through macroeconomic 
austerity policies.  
Furthermore, as stated by Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, (2012), this led 
to a “chicken game”characterised by hard intergovernmental bargaining and 
brinksmanship with the north having the upper hand. Intergovernmental 
bargaining led to further integrative regulations and supranational powers 
like the SGP, banking union, EFSF and ESM. Therefore, the northern 
countries push the crisis-hit countries to the brink of sovereign default; 
while the southern countries tried to convince the solvent countries that a 
rescue was requiredto save the euro. Conversely, thisbrinksmanship was at 
the heart of this“chicken game”. The result was that the solvent northern 
countries could push through the strict regulations and fiscal adjustments 
in return for giving the indebted southern countries the required funds. In 
short, the northern countries led by Germany were able to push thru their 
agenda on integration during the crisis. 
Moreover, according to Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, (2012), the new 
phase of integration in response to the crisis thru institutions and 
regulations was deliberately limited in scope and power; mainly due to the 
preferences of the solvent northern countries who had the clout in the 
intergovernmental bargaining process. However, the imposition of strict 
fiscal rules and macroeconomic adjustments cannot be forced upon the 
indebted countries by the EU or the solvent countries; hence the system 
remains unstable for the foreseeable future. 
As highlighted by Schimmelfennig, (2017), from an 
intergovernmentalism perspective on the crisis, the euro crises was a 
typical predicament involving intergovernmental bargaining between 
converging and diverging member states’ interests to rescue/strengthen the 
euro and EMU. The crisis highlighted a clash of interests between common 
interdependencies and different preferences on the nature of integration. 
Additionally, as noted by Schimmelfennig, (2017), in line with 
intergovernmentalism, the dominant actors were the member states’ 
governments as evidenced in the intergovernmental institutions which 
coordinated and implemented the rescue programmes and 
macroeconomics policies as opposed to the classical Community methods. 
Furthermore, increased integration does not necessarily mean further 
delegation of core state powers to supranational actors.  
2.2.2. The neofunctionalism explanation 
As hinted by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), neofunctionalism explained the 
long-term perspective. The euro crises' severity was mainly due to the “half 
baked” functionality of economic and monetary integration introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty. Neofunctionalism dictates that path dependency 
meant that member states were primarily concerned with saving the Euro 
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generating intense pressures to fixing the flaws when the euro crises hit. 
Initially, the agreements introducedseveral institutions under the direct 
influence of member states; subsequence agreements nudged these 
institutions towards control by the EU. The ECB also obtained more power 
to act like any central bank to supply money and buy assets through QE 
and outright monetary transactions policies. Hence, the crisis was the result 
of an unintended spillover and concluded with enhanced 
supranationalism.  
Neofunctionalism focuses on the endogenous nature of the euro crises; 
as highlighted by Schimmelfennig, (2017), neofunctionalists attribute the 
crisis to the functioning of the integrated process. This perspective hints at 
the true underlining nature of the integration process; it is a very 
unpredictable, highly complexed and dynamic process. Meaning that while 
state actors havethe power to shape the initial integration agreement, they 
cannot control the consequences, moreover, this is the supranational actors' 
domain. Conversely, the intensity and process of change come thru 
spillover, where an integration process spills over to another function. The 
spillover process does not necessarily trigger a crisis; however, a possible 
explanation for any crisis in the EU isthe existence of a massive spillover. 
Further, as argued by Schimmelfennig, (2017), there were several aspects 
of the euro crises, which could be explained by neofunctionalism: 
1. Endogenous causes of the crisis 
The euro crises may have started with an exogenous event in the 
form of the global financial crisis; however, the onslaught of the 
integration issues at the heart of the euro crises was mainly due to the 
inherent economic tensions and institutional flaws of EMU. Put 
simply; the euro crisis resultedfrom the exogenous shock exposure of 
endogenous tensions and dependencies highlighted by the lack of a 
credible fiscal policy to deal with such events. A common argument 
against the EMU is that monetary union without fiscal union does not 
work; the result of an intergovernmental bargaining issue, at its heart 
lays a conflict of interests between the two powerhouses of European 
integration: France and Germany.Essentially, the same underlining 
conflict that emerge during the euro crises. As already alluded to 
previously, Germany had the superior bargaining powers; hence it 
was able to shape monetary union powerfully according to its 
preferences: inflation targeting, independent central bank and only 
fiscal supervision. Furthermore, the rules governing membership of 
the EMU were relaxed and weakly enforced 
2. Path-dependent on the intergovernmental bargaining before the 
Maastricht Treaty 
The strong backing for the euro and EMU by the Eurozone 
countries during the euro crises is, possibly, due to the initial 
endogenous decision on monetary union. Hence, as quoted by 
Schimmelfennig, (2017), the euro crises resulted from a “heavily 
discounted or unintended effect”. However, Eurozone and member 
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interdependencies' sunk costs prohibited any orderly exit strategy by 
Eurozone member states during the euro crises. Thus, the member 
states somewhat reluctantly agreed upon a set of further integrative 
steps they had initially dismissed during the Maastricht treaty's 
intergovernmental negotiations.This decision for further integration 
is path-dependent on the decisions taken during the 
intergovernmental bargaining for the Maastricht treaty. 
3. Trans/supranational actors drove the negotiation and resulting 
decisions of the states 
As already stated previously, a “chicken game” between the creditors 
and debtors ensued after the initial shock. The resulting reaction of 
the transnational financial markets endangering the debtors' ability 
and putting downwards pressures on the sovereign debts' prices 
forced the EU members into actions. Thus, meaning that the creditor 
member states were now heavily exposed to the debtorsthru the 
transnational banks. Therefore, forcing all member states to agree on 
further incremental integrative actions. However, the national actors 
might have been unable to prevent further contagious effects and 
eventual disintegration of the Eurozone, if it was not to the 
supranational interventions by the ECB. Against 
intergovernmentalism assumptions, the ECB was the main factor in 
stabilising the Eurozone through monetary instruments that were at 
the limit of the Maastricht agreement on monetary union. The ECB 
was able to act against many internal and external policymakers' 
wishes because the Maastricht treaty granted it the required 
independence.  
As perfectly summarised by Schimmelfennig, (2017), the euro crises 
hints at the intergovernmental bargaining process becoming 
embedded into neofunctionalism’s strategic path-dependent 
development of integration. Moreover, the crisis outcomes generally 
typify the lowest common denominator solutions that are likely to 
spillover into further integration. This process is the “failing forward” 
argument of Jones, Kelemen and Meunier, (2016) stated previously. 
 
2.2.3. The postfunctionalism explanation 
According to Hooghe & Marks, (2019) in contrast, postfunctionalism 
perceived the response by the EU to the euro crises as a result of domestic 
politics and, particularly, the rise of nationalist opposed to European 
integration. This issue was critical to the EU’s inadequate and inconsistent 
response throughout the crises leading to the spiral of the crisis. Moreover, 
the domestic politics during the crisis meant a resistance to supranational 
solutions. Furthermore, northern governments were reluctant to heed 
advice to ditch their “me first” economic growth policies fearing public 
opinion. Thus, the combination of fear and greedundermined the EU 
response nearly led to the collapse of the Eurozone. A further complication, 
according to postfunctionalism, was the politicization of the crisis. 
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Conversely, this led to a narrowing of reform options in the wake of the 
crisis. This procrastination meant that instead of the urgently required 
reform of the Eurozone; a cocktail of monetary policy, bailouts and 
tightening regulations resulted. Moreover, the price paid by all sides was 
high. 
As hinted by Schimmelfennig, (2017), the euro crises represented a 
perfect picture for postfunctionalism, a crisis with all the components of the 
postfunctionalist perspective on European integration. However, in reality, 
it was a significant puzzle because it had all the components: 
 The anti-EU politicisation 
 An increasingly eurosceptic public opinion  
 An increase in the popularity of populist and eurosceptic national 
political parties in member states 
Nevertheless, the resulting integration process was not as predicted by 
the postfunctionalism school. Postfunctionalism predicts that these 
components should reflect a strong disincentive for national governments 
in furthering the integration process. In reality, due mainly to addressing 
weaknesses in the monetary union and banking regulations, the integration 
process was able to gather pace during the early stages of the euro crises. 
As stated by Schimmelfennig, (2017), the reasons were simple: 
 Formation of strong coalitions of EU friendly national governments, 
for the most part, the members’ national government were from the 
political mainstream parties which were centre-right or left. Before 2015, 
most of the snap elections presented an EU friendly national government. 
Hence further integration was able to proceed without any significant 
issues. 
 Avoidance of constraining referendums, this was done by designing 
treaty revisions or new treaties in such a way as to avoid the necessity of a 
referendum. It is essential to note that generally, Eurozone governments 
have been reluctant to embark onsignificant integration treaties during the 
euro crises. 
 Fear of economic doom if the euro was to collapse or partial 
disintegration of the EU or Eurozone.  
 As stated previously, the critical integration processes during the 
euro crises were done by the supranational bodies, such as the ECB, out of 
necessity to contain the crisis did not need the member governments' 
rectification.  
However, according to Schimmelfennig, (2017), in January 2015 Greece 
elected the left-wing populist Syriza party which formed a coalition with 
eurosceptic right-wing parties. Thus, enabling the Greek government to 
hold a successful anti-austerity EU Bailout referendum. However, the 
negotiations' outcome was an even harsher austerity programme, 
reflectingthe Greek government low bargaining power in the “chicken 
game”throughout the euro crises. 
As summarised by Schimmelfennig, (2017), even though theoretically 
postfunctionalism was correct to highlight the rise of mass level euro-
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scepticism politicisation effects on EU integration and to a certain extent it 
did make intergovernmental negotiations harder. Nevertheless, the adverse 
effects predicted by postfunctionalism did not materialize. However, the 
extensive further integration indicated by neofunctionalism resulting from 
a “good crisis” did not materialise either. Conversely, all three theories are 
required to gain a deeper understanding of the euro crises and response of 
the EU. Additionally, as noted by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), the three 
theories complement each other in explaining the euro crises; while 
neofunctionalism clarified the issues of supranational reforms in the face of 
the euro crises. Intergovernmentalism rationalised the diverse national 
preferences and intergovernmental bargaining, which resulted in partial 
solutions to the euro crises. Moreover, postfunctionalism explains that 
domestic politics and the politicisation of the issues underpinning the euro 
crises led to a war of ideologies between proponents and opponents of 
European integration. 
 
2.3. The  Brexit process 
As highlighted by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), in explaining the issues and 
effects involving the EU referendum and Brexit, postfunctionalism 
certainly has greater leverage. However, this does not mean that we should 
discount the contributions of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. 
They both stress the argument of strong economic interdependence as a 
case against hard Brexit. Nevertheless, in contrast with neofunctionalism 
and postfunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism does further states 
that Brexit is epiphenomenal. 
Conversely, as hinted by Schimmelfennig, (2018a) and Schimmelfennig, 
(2018b), the key to explaining the Brexit crises lays in a combination of 
postfunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. The central axis is the 
activation of article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which shifted the emphasis 
from integration to disintegration. There is a difference between 
demanding an opt-out from an integrative function and exiting the EU by 
invoking article 50. As highlighted by Schimmelfennig, (2018a), 
postfunctionalism seems to explain the UK government's reasonings and 
actions for the Brexit route. However, according to Schimmelfennig, 
(2018b), the intergovernmental negotiations after the invoking of article 50 
seem to be best explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. Moreover, 
liberal intergovernmentalism partly explains the preferences of the EU and 
member states.  
2.3.1. The postfunctionalism explanation 
As hinted by Schimmelfennig, (2018a) and Hooghe & Marks, (2019), the 
rise of UKIP and an increasing number of eurosceptic within the 
Conservative party forced UK prime minister David Cameron to promise a 
referendum on the negotiated EU agreement. He was gambling on the 
hope of appeasing his backbenchers while deflecting the UKIP challenge. 
An in/out referendum was passed into law the support of 81 Conservatives 
MPs going against the wishes of the government. As predicted by 
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postfunctionalism the referendum campaign was fought on national 
identity versus economic consequences. The leave campaign focussed on 
the identity and self-determination issues promising to limit immigration 
and to take back control of the key factors of national concerns. The remain 
campaign focussed on the inevitable negative economic consequences of 
leaving the EU with many researches from international and national 
organisations as well as economic academics highlighting the economic 
downturn in the short to long term. The two sides sidestepped each-others 
arguments. The referendum resulted in a close defeat to the remain 
campaign 51.89% to 48.11%. 
Moreover, as argued by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), postfunctionalism 
analysis of the role of national identity in mass settings, such as the 
referendum, was proved correct. Further, evidence since the referendum 
has illustrated the hardening polarisation of the two sides. Few events have 
demonstrated the impact of politicisation more than the EU referendum. 
Far from reducing tensions, political infighting and divisions in the UK; the 
EU referendum exacerbated them on every level. A key argument against 
the EU referendum is that it consisted of a simple choice to a complicated 
argument consisting of many compromises and trade-offs. 
As stated by Schimmelfennig, (2018a), according to postfunctionalism 
differentiated integration and disintegration are attributed to a 
politicisation process, pointing to a shift in European integration issues 
from interest groups to the masses where political identity plays a more 
significant role. Here several factors are driving the politicisation process: 
 the depth of integration 
 exclusive national identity 
 Euroscepticism  
 referendums 
According to Schimmelfennig, (2018a), the demand for disintegration 
centre around the three hypotheses based on the last three factors: 
1. the spillover of integration into identity-relevant areas 
2. the rise of Eurosceptic political parties 
3. the increase availability or use of EU integration referendums 
Conversely, with Brexit, all three hypotheses were central for the 
increase in the demand for disintegration. As argued by Schimmelfennig, 
(2018a), the spillover of the EU's enlargement to Eastern Europe gave rise 
to an unanticipated and undesired increase in immigration to the UK. 
However, the UK has always supported the enlargement and was one of 
four states to open its labour market to the new member states in 2004. 
Nevertheless, despite abandoning their liberal immigration policy and 
pledging to control the flow of immigration, the UK continued to be the 
focus of intra-EU immigration due to the EU policies on freedom of 
movement for any EU citizen. A survey in 2015 highlighted the extent of 
the UK’s population fears with 63% ticking immigration as the number one 
cause for concern.  
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According to Schimmelfennig, (2018a), the issue of immigration gave 
rise to the Eurosceptic UKIP political party with its dual anti-EU and anti-
immigration messages. As with all populist political parties, UKIP's success 
was in politicising and communicating these two issues to the masses. 
Moreover, UKIP was able to infuse EU membership issues with the 
immigration issue and frustration with governmental performance. Thus, 
leading UKIP to electoral success, especially in the 2014 European elections 
and emphasizing EU membership.  
Although, the government did not state the nature of the exit from the 
EU before or during the referendum. However, the government under 
pressure from its backbenchers and UKIP decided to go with a “hard” 
Brexit when the UK invoked article 50, signalling the beginning of 
negotiations to reach an agreement within two years. As stated previously, 
postfunctionalism does not have a credible explanation to the negotiations 
and bargaining in the aftermath of Article 50. 
2.3.2. The liberal intergovernmentalism explanation 
As highlighted by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), the causes of Brexit were not 
just British but also European. In essence, an explanation Brexit is giving 
thru the use of two critical principles of intergovernmentalism. The course 
of European integration is dependent on cooperation facilitated by 
intergovernmental bargaining, and ironically, intergovernmental 
bargaining depends on economic interests and NOT on a referendum 
result. Conversely, both the UK and EU's economic interestis in 
maintaining the UK’s membership of the single market. However, that the 
negotiations turned out the way they turned out was a lesson in 
asymmetry. It is one thing to negotiate an opt-out from a function or 
reform; it is quite another to opt-out from Article 50, the rules governing 
exit from the EU. Moreover, the UK was in a weak bargaining position in 
comparison to the EU.  
According to Schimmelfennig, (2018b), the negotiations in the aftermath 
of the invocation of Article 50 supports the superior explanation of 
asymmetrical interdependence and bargain power of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Since liberal intergovernmentalism, as in any other 
negotiation theory, revolves around the two negotiation sides' initial 
preference constellations. Thus, the initial preferences of the UK and EU are 
critical to the Brexit negotiations. Initially, the UK’s position was to stem 
the flow of EU based immigration, however, in the aftermath of the 
referendum the UK’s government decided that a soft Brexit would imply 
remaining under the EU's influence3 without having a say in the future 
direction of the EU. The basis of the UK’s preferences is to leave the EU but 
still have services and goods access to the EU free market. This scenario 
prompted Michel Barnier comment: “Cherry picking is not an option” on 6th 
December 2016. In contrast, the EU’s preferences were to protect the EU 
and euro's integrity and signal that leaving the EU is very difficult and 
 
3 The acceptance of EU legislations, Court of Justice jurisdiction, freedom of movement for 
labour and “large contributions” to the EU budget 
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economically costly. With two polar axis preferences, the negotiations were 
going to be difficult. 
As stated by Schimmelfennig, (2018b), in intergovernmental bargaining 
between the EU and UK, the EU had both material and institutional 
superior bargaining power. A major bargaining advantage is the UK 
exports 44% to the EU, while the EU only exports 6-7% to the UK. 
Institutionally, the EU had superior power due to four circumstances: 
1. The European Commission negotiated on behalf of all the EU 
member states. Thus, giving it unity and hence superior bargaining power 
2. The withdrawal agreement requires the consent of the European 
Parliament meaning any member state not happy with the agreement could 
theoretically block it 
3. Article 50 imposes two years to complete the process; however, a 
country could extend the period, if the European Parliament votes in 
favour of a request to extend by the exiting nation 
4. A requirement of ratification by each member state for a 
“mixedagreement” that is an agreement beyond a basic free trade deal 
According to Schimmelfennig, (2018b), in line with liberal 
intergovernmentalism, the EU bargaining powers was reflected in the first 
step agreement. The terms of the agreement were: 
1. Negotiations on further agreements only start once there was 
sufficient progress on the withdrawal terms 
2. All parties honour financial obligations under the current financial 
framework ending in 2020 
3. Avoidance of a hard border andcontinuation of internal market and 
customs union in Ireland 
4. Guarantee the rights of EU citizens residing in the UK after the 
withdrawal 
2.3.3. The neofunctionalism explanation 
As Hooghe & Marks, (2019) and Cavlak, (2019) states central to the 
neofunctionalism explanation of the effects of Brexit on the UK is the 
concept of spillover, which states thatan agreement to integrate a function 
into the EU spills over to another function. This concept works 
asymmetrically, meaning that EU integration had spilt over several 
national public organisations' and governmental departments' workings. 
The big issue is to unwind the long duration of the spillover effect of EU 
integration is going to be both complicated and time-consuming. 
Furthermore, there are the knowneconomic issues; in addition to thesocial, 
cultural and political issues currently in play. These issueshas resulted in a 
21 months transitional period after the completion of the Brexit 
negotiations. 
Conversely, the big question is whether spill back is successful in the 
disintegration of the regulations and functions inthe aftermath of Brexit. 
Whether or not spill back is successful, the EU hopes that the difficulties 
experience by the UK in the negotiations and inevitable unwinding of 
integration processeswillillustrate how difficult and costly it is, and thus 
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discouraging others. Moreover as argued by Hooghe & Marks, (2019), 
another critical factor in neofunctionalist reading into Brexit is centred 
around the fact that the health of the UK’s economy is to a certain extent 
heavily dependent on the EU as illustrated earlier and by  Fakhry, (2019a). 
Therefore, the threat of economic disruptions would serve as a disincentive 
to a hard Brexit. 
As argued by Schimmelfennig, (2018b), the differences in the three 
integration theories explanation of Brexit highlight the strengths of the 
theories: 
 Postfunctionalism explains how Brexit came into being 
 Neofunctionalism explains the effect the UK from Brexit 
 Liberal intergovernmentalism explains the factors behind the Brexit 
negotiations, including the reasoning for the UK weak position in the 
intergovernmental bargaining process  
 
2.4. A review of behavioural finance during the crises 
As observed by Barberis, (2013), central to the global financial crisis is 
the concept of a bubble in real estate during the late 1990s – early 2000s, 
particularly in the USA4; meaningthat prices reached levels which were 
unsustainable due to irrational thinking or friction in the housing market. 
There are two concepts behind the realisation of a bubble:  
 investor beliefs.  
One theory of beliefs is the bullish vs bearish friction in the market, 
which leads to bearish investors omitting the market altogether. The 
prices reflect the bullish investors’ views; hence the market becomes 
overvalued.  
A second belief theory argues that investors extrapolate historical 
outcomes too far into the future. The argument based on the 
representativeness heuristicstates that many people base their 
expectation on “over-extrapolating” small samples of the overall 
observations. Thus, prices rise and hence bubbles form.  
Lastly is the theory of overconfidence in the analysis and information. 
This theory dictates that investors could become overconfidence in the 
information or analysis leading to increases in the prices and hence a 
bubble formulation.  
 investor preferences 
The first theory is that investors often become less risk-averse and 
increasingly profit maximisers once they profit on an asset. Thus, keep 
investing in the asset, rising the price and therefore triggering a bubble.  
Another theory is the overvaluation of a new idea due to investors 
relating these to lotteries. The basis of this theory is that investors may 
think that the new concept could be a high lottery-payoff, hence 
 
4 Although not limited to the USA, there was evidence of real estate bubbles in the UK and 
across Europe (particularly in Spain)  
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investing in the asset in the hope of obtaining a significant payoff on a 
small investment and thus increasing the price and creating a bubble. 
According to Barberis, (2013), the most likely explanation of the housing 
price bubble is a multi-level deviation of the past extrapolation theory: 
1. The homebuyers 
2. The mortgage lenders 
3. The securitisation firms 
4. The rating agencies 
5. The investors 
Ofcourse, in some countries, securitisation did not apply; hence, the 
over-extrapolation hypothesis suggests mortgage lenders were basing the 
hypothesis on past low mortgage default rates. In summary, the 
commonality between most of the recent bubbles is a tendency for market 
participants at different levels to over extrapolates past performance too far 
into the future. 
As highlighted by Barberis, (2013), the accumulation of subprime-linked 
mortgages and securities requirescognitive behaviour analysis. The puzzle 
was why, despite the enormity of the risk, did banks take on the 
exposure?” There are three possible explanations: 
 the bad incentives view dictates incentiviseparticipants only care 
about their compensations and bonuses in the short term and not 
about the risk to their organisation in the long term 
 the bad model view implies faulty reasoning on behave of 
participants who were genuinely unaware of the risks posed to their 
organisations. This explanation may have been due to the belief and/or 
model usedthat tended to extrapolate past growth too far in too the 
future without taking account of risk 
 the bad luck view hypothesises that rational participants could not 
have foreseen the subsequent bad performance, hence the risk to the 
organisation was due to bad luck. This explanation can be ruled out 
due to any careful and exhaustive analysis of these assets, especially 
during the years immediately precedingthe crisis, by rational 
participants, would have highlighted the riskiness of these assets. 
However, as argued by Barberis, (2013), both the bad incentives and 
models' views are incomplete views of the pre-crisis period. On the one 
hand, these organisations employedhighly skilled and intelligent 
employees, which begs the question about the plausibility of the bad model 
view. On the other hand, the fact that a high number of participants 
knowingly and repeatedly exposed their organisations to high risks just for 
the stake of a bonus does not sit well with the human mind.  
As suggested by Barberis, (2013), an alternative hypothesis dictates that 
participants were vaguely aware of the high risks. However, by belief 
manipulation, they deluded themselves into thinking that their 
model/belief was not risky and was positive for their organisation’s 
wellbeing. Psychologically speaking, an explanation of this mindset is thru 
the concept ofcognitive dissonance; in simple terms, the discomfort that 
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exists when an action conflicts with the typically positive self-image. 
Conversely, to remove this discomfort, many resorts to the manipulation of 
their mindset. Hence, by manipulating their beliefsinto thinking their 
model was not endangering the organisation or livelihood of many people, 
they could maintain their positive self-image and remove any 
uncomfortable cognitive dissonance. An example would be for the market 
participant not to analyse the subprime loan or security carefully.  
Moreover, as noted by Barberis, (2013), a similar explanation could be 
used for the credit rating agencies. The agents' dilemma was a trade-off 
between personal dissonance by giving the required ratings and 
competition by not giving the required ratings. As in the market 
participants’ cases, the agent overcomes this dissonance by manipulating 
their beliefs via merely convincing themselves that the asset prices, in this 
case, houses, will continue to rise and thus subprime defaults will remain 
low. Since, according to the representativeness heuristic, people naturally 
tend to believe past trends will continue.  
Furthermore, as stated by Barberis, (2013), twoadditional factors in the 
manipulation of beliefs occurred in the case of the subprime securitisation: 
1. they were overly complicated assets to understand, and hence it 
was complicated to prove they were highly risky assets. Therefore, making 
it easier for many participants to delude themselves about the risks posed 
2. the representative heuristics which dictated that since the prices of 
the underlining asset, in this case, houses, were likely to continue rising, 
hence these subprime securities were likely to continue to have low risks 
Moreover, as argued by Barberis, (2013), the belief manipulation 
hypothesis is a valid alternative to the bad belief, bad model and bad luck 
views explaining what happened before the global financial crisis. 
By the end of 2005/early 2006, the housing market bubble burst, and 
subprime defaults rose. Nevertheless, as subprime defaults rose, the 
subprime loans' securitisation was continuing; eventually leading to the 
global financial crisis. As noted by Barberis, (2013), a surprising feature of 
the crisis was the dramatic decline of many risky assets of various types. 
Given the relatively small size of the subprime loan, the widespread and 
dramatic nature of the falls in prices of risky assets did, to say the least, 
take most people by surprise. Moreover, the speed at which the crisis 
spread globally suddenly bought into context the financial market's 
integrative nature. 
As Barberis, (2013) hints, a possible explanation is the amplification 
mechanism. During s crisis, the amplification mechanism dictated that any 
market participant facing a loss in the value of subprime backed securities 
tend to sell other risky assets. Thus, pushing down the other risky assets' 
prices, forcing them to sell their other less risky assets, thereby ensuring a 
loss or margin spiral. This behaviour is fundamental to explaining the 
global spread of the crisis, particularly to Europe. 
However, as noted by Barberis, (2013), the loss aversion and ambiguity 
aversion related amplification mechanisms may also have played a vital 
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role in the global financial crisis. Ambiguity aversiondictatesthat in 
situations where participants cannot assign probabilities to future trends, 
they become increasingly averse. An extension to the ambiguity aversion is 
the competence hypothesis presented by Heath & Tversky, (1991). The 
competence hypothesis dictates thatthe level of competence at analysingthe 
situation determines whether the person is ambiguity averse or seeking. 
This hypothesis partly explains the global financial crisis; the explanation 
maintains that the initial loss on the subprime backed securities made 
investors less competent in analysing risky assets. Hence, increasing 
ambiguity aversion leading to a reduction in their holding of risky assets, 
therefore further reducing these assets' price. 
According to Barberis, (2013), the second fundamental explanation isthe 
loss aversion theory of Kahneman & Tversky, (1979). This obverse that 
losses are more sensitive to market participants than profits of similar 
magnitudes. The less obvious observation is that the degree of aversion 
may vary with time, depending on the trend of losses or gains. Thus, any 
recent loss increases loss aversion making them less willing to take risks 
that they would have taken otherwise. In terms of the global financial crisis, 
the initial decline in the price of subprime securities made market 
participants loss averse; thus, selling the risky assets on their books, further 
reducing the price and increasing loss aversion. Both the ambiguity and 
loss aversions played a big part in the amplification mechanism during the 
global financial crisis and arguably in turning the crisis from a local to a 
global event since the subprime crisis began in the US housing market.  
Another explanation of the global financial crisis as provided by 
Szyszka, (2010) is thru the fear/hope conundrum5. As explained by Lopes, 
(1987) and Shefrin & Statman, (2000), the two emotions dictating risk 
management are fear and hope. While fear is determined by an 
overweighing of the worst-case scenario probabilities relative to the best-
case scenario, hope or greed is the opposite effect. Simply put, hope (greed) 
make market participants unduly optimistic on investment opportunities, 
while fear makes them increasingly unoptimistic on investment 
opportunities.  
The global financial crisis is a lesson in both hope and fear. In general, 
hope rises during a booming economy and asset pricing bubble; however, 
fear increases during a recession and/or financial crisis. According to 
Szyszka, (2010), macroeconomic factors shaped the background to the 
pre/post-financial crisis. Hence, the pre-crisis asset price bubble in the 
housing market and securitised loans was, to a certain extent, the result of 
over-exuberated hope created by an overheating global economy, 
particularly in the US. Also, taxes and the cost of finance were low, which 
gave rise to optimism in the financial market. Essentially, during times of a 
booming economy, risk-free assets generally offer low rates of returns 
relative to the optimism in the financial market.  
 
5Szyszka, (2010) refers to greed and fear but Shefrin & Statman, (2000) and Lopes, (1987) 
refer to it as hope and fear 
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As hinted by Szyszka, (2010), market participants began to exhibit 
increasing hope given this background of long-lasting economic prosperity. 
The feeling of hope was demonstrated by the substitution ofmoney and 
safe-haven assets with loans and ever increasingly risky assets to get a 
growing return on investment. However, there is a thin line between hope 
and greed. As some market participants became increasingly hopeful of 
maximising asset returns, they took ever-increasing risks, in essence, 
investing in high yielding securitised subprime loans. Furthermore, the 
unconscious development of greed as the market participants increased 
their hopes meant that some turned to massive financial leverage to 
increase their returns. This unconscious feeling of greed meant that often 
many market participants were indebtedmore than ten times their worth 
on the expectation ofmaximising their returnson the high-risk assets in the 
belief of the continuation of the booming economy and housing market 
bubble. Market participants exhibited increasing greed in the later stages of 
the securitised subprime loans price bubble due to the underlining housing 
market bubble's collapse in late-2005 to mid-2006. The continuation of 
investment in these high yielding/high-risk assets even after the collapse of 
the underlining assets’ market is a sign of greed being the overwhelming 
psychological emotion in some market participants' mindset. Conversely, 
afundamental explanation is that greed blinds market participants on the 
risks of such assets.Thus, making them overconfident and unable to 
analyse market and risk trends, hence underestimating and 
underpricingrisk. 
As Szyszka, (2010), suggests, fear and hope have opposite attractions on 
the behaviour of market participants and generally on the trends in the 
markets. Hence, it comes as no surprise that when the global financial crisis 
hit; market participants’ fear levelsrose quickly. Furthermore, an ever-
increasing level of fear inevitably leads to panic, which intensifies the 
depreciation of assets. Thus, increasing the inflow of investments in safe-
haven markets such as particular sovereign debt and commodities markets, 
more specifically the high graded sovereign bonds and gold markets. 
During the global financial crises, as market participants grow ever anxious 
concerning the securitised subprime loans market, they became 
increasingly worried about the extent of the global financial sector’s 
holding of these “bad” assets. Hence fear increased and spread to the global 
financial sector as observed by panic runs on the global banking sector 
terminating in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an investment bank at 
the heart of the securitised subprime loans, among other major global 
financial institutions. There are two further conceptualisations of fear that 
could exuberate a crisis: 
 The policy effect dictates the action or inaction of policymakers has 
the potential of hiking fear among market participants. This issue is key 
to the lengthening of the crisis, the indecision or incorrect actions bythe 
central banks and government had a negative impact. In the aftermath 
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of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, central banks and governments 
across the globe were forced into action by events.  
 The spillover effects dictate that if a financial institution has trouble 
selling a “bad” asset, it may try to sell a “good” asset. Hence, turning the 
good asset into a bad asset because the market is overflooded and 
therefore, the price drops.This situation occurred during the global 
financial crisis. 
As stated previously, the roots of the euro crises had its origins in the 
issues at the heart of European monetary union. Put simply; EMU was an 
incomplete and compromisedintegrative process with many issues that 
were exposed by theeuro crises as hinted by Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 
(2018) and Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016). Nevertheless, as indicated by 
(Cohen, 2003), in the aftermath of the euro's introduction, many were 
optimistic about the new currency's prospects, some even predicting the 
euro will challenge the US dollar for global supremacy. Relatively few, 
such as Feldstein, (1997), questioned theenthusiasmtowards the new 
currency. Many pieces of research into the integrative nature of the EMU 
and the euro in the early yearsfound that the euro and EMU had a hugely 
beneficial impact on the integration process in the economy and financial 
markets as argued by Danthine, Giavazzi & Von Thadden, (2000) and 
Trichet, (2001) amongst others. 
This optimism added to the initial rebuttal of the global financial crisis 
as merely temporary contagious effect from the US, as stated by 
Dabrowski, (2010) meant that the European response was late and 
uncoordinated. Furthermore, as Galati & Tsatsaronis, (2003) and Baele et al., 
(2004) pointed out the impact of the euro and EMU wasnot uniform across 
the Eurozonemeaning that a two-tire Eurozone was developing, namely the 
core member states and the periphery member states (primarily the GIIPS6 
nations). Even before the euro criseserupted, there were signs of 
macroeconomics weaknesses amongst the Eurozone member states. As 
highlighted by Dabrowski, (2010) and Szyszka, (2013) amongst others, 
someperiphery member states had weak macroeconomics fundamentals 
before the introduction of the euro. Moreover, the global financial crisis 
highlighted the inadequatefinancial regulations and economic policies at 
the heart of the integrative process as hinted by Dabrowski, (2010), 
Szyszka, (2013), Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016) and Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, (2018). A key point reflected in thedisoriented and confusing 
miscommunication by the EU and member states as hinted by Carmassi & 
Micossi, (2010) and Fakhry, (2019b). 
Initially, the euro crises were an extension of the global financial crisis to 
the European scene. It was a case of how to implement an economic 
recovery plan sand save the European banking system; which was the case 
throughout the global economy. It was not until the Greek government 
fiscal deficit revision announcement on 5th November 2009, as stated by 
 
6 GIIPS or PIIGS nations are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However many 
prefer to omit Ireland, therefore referencing the GIPS or PIGS.   
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Fakhry, (2019b) that the euro crises increasingly became Europeanised as 
illustrated by Metiu, (2011), Mohl & Sondermann, (2013) and Szyszka, 
(2013). Once again, the spotlight fell on the inadequate and disintegrated 
financial regulations and economic policies at the heart of the integrative 
process highlighted by Szyszka, (2013), Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016) 
and Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018). Moreover, the lack of a coordinated 
response and often confusing communication by the member states and EU 
continued to hint at the intergovernmental bargaining and disagreement. 
The vital macroeconomic issues at the heart of the euro crises, as hinted at 
previously in this paper, amongst others were: 
 A monetary union of difference economies 
 Inflexibility of monetary policies 
 Lack of fiscal watchdog and rising sovereign debt 
According to Szyszka, (2013), several behavioural traitsthat were, to a 
certain extent, implicit in prolonging and intensifying the euro crises. The 
first is thehuman/macroeconomic time horizon conflict. According to 
Kahneman & Tversky, (1979), humans tend to make decisions in short time 
horizons and focus on the fear of immediate losses while discounting 
remote outcomes. As hinted by Szyszka, (2013), this differs with the work 
and type of the person. Typically, investors evaluate their investment 
decision on a yearly basis while politicians like to think in terms of an 
electorate term. Moreover, consumers usually evaluate their consumption 
in accordance to their monthly salary. However, theories dictate that the 
laws of macroeconomics tend to be on a longer time horizon spectrum. 
Thus, there is a danger thatthe laws of macroeconomics are often 
overlooked by this short-sightedness by market participants and 
policymakers in the decision-making process.  
As highlighted by Szyszka, (2013), the importance of this issue is that 
some of the peripheral member states (i.e. Greece, Ireland and Spain) were 
blinded by the previous economic upturn extrapolation errors and short-
termism on all three levels: governmental, consumer and market 
participants. The advanced of EMU and the Euro created a false sense of 
stability andprolong economic growth that was extrapolated into the 
future, failing to see the strategic consequences of EMU and hence 
associatedrisks. This false sense created a level of confidence in the 
economy and financial markets created by the integrative process of EMU 
and the Euro, which led to an overspend in all three levels across some 
Eurozone countries. Thus, creating a bubble and an overleveraged 
economy based on high consumptions and limited savings. 
According to Szyszka, (2013), the next behavioural trait is the 
underestimation/underpricingof risk. At the heart of this trait lays greed 
which blinded consumers, market participants and governments into 
pursuing avenues which led to increasingly higher consumptions, profits 
and popularities respectively. Other behavioural factors were influencing 
thistrait of which overconfidence is the critical aspect: 
 above-average effect 
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 calibration effect 
 illusion of control bias 
 ungrounded optimism 
Thus, resulting in the underpricing of risk. A key contributory factor to 
overconfidence is wishful thinking, as observed in many politicians and 
market participants as reasoned by (Szyszka, 2013). Other vital 
contributory factors are: 
 the self-attribution bias which states people tend to attribute 
successes to one-selves while ascribing failures to external factors such 
as bad luck or other people mistakes 
 the confirmation bias suggests people often seek to analyse their 
performance by selecting information consistent with their opinions 
while excluding information that conflicts with their views. Hence, thru 
this selective approach, they may have an illusion of validity as 
described by Einhorn & Hogarth, (1978). 
As argued by Szyszka, (2013), these factors influenced the underpricing 
of risk by all three levels contributing to a seemingly never-ending bull 
market. Thus, misjudging or missing of certain warning signs that would 
have prevented this overconfidence. Moreover, market participants 
thought they could beat the market on their skills rather than the markets' 
general trend. Furthermore, people’s tendency to overplay certainty and 
downplay uncertainty created an environment where theunderpricing of 
risk could foster. According to Kahneman & Tversky, (1979), the prospect 
theory dictates the decision-making process is affected by the S-shaped 
value and weighing functions of the utility of a total assessment. 
Furthermore, the weighing function is set to 0 when the probability is very 
low and set to 1 when the probability is high. Thus, pointing at the 
tendency for market participants to account for only highly likely events in 
their decision-making process. 
The third behavioural trait during the euro crises was the euro heuristic; 
as derived by Szyszka, (2013), the term indicatesmarket participants willing 
to put all EMU member states under the same euro label. The theoretical 
argument is there is an overload of daily news for any human to process, 
hence the requirement to simplify arises, this simplification is often called a 
heuristic. The heuristic may be a useful procedure in dealing with the 
information overload; however, there is a danger that using heuristic 
techniques to base decision-making processes on could lead to 
misjudgements as argued by Tversky & Kahneman, (1974). The euro 
heuristic led to market participants underpricing some EMU member 
states' risk when the macroeconomics factors were telling a different story. 
As stated by Szyszka, (2013), an example is the annual spread in the10-year 
government yields of Germany and Greece, which was a mere 0.27 
percentage points in 2007. There are two possible psychological 
explanations for the euro heuristic. The first explanation is the halo effect, 
meaning humans' tendency to form an impression in one area influenced 
by an opinion in another area. 
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Moreover, as argued by Nisbett & Wilson, (1977), humans sometimes 
concentrate on the most visible characteristic of a piece of information and 
attached significance to it in forming an opinion on a different matter 
discounting any other information. Another explanation could be the 
availability bias as derived by Tversky & Kahneman, (1974) is the tendency 
to rely heavily on events/information from memory. Since not all memory 
is available at any given time, thus leading to short-termism or salient 
event heavily distorting beliefs.  
As stated previously, there was too much optimism surrounding the 
euro and EMU at the time of their launch, which carried until the early 
parts of the global financial crisis. Thus, providing emphasis to the halo 
effect and availability bias which converted into the optimism in the 
financial markets. Hence meaning market participants disregarded relevant 
macroeconomics factors which highlighted the risks and valuations of the 
periphery member states, primarilythe GIPS states, sovereign debt. 
As stated by Szyszka, (2013), a puzzling factor in the euro crises is the 
European banks' somewhat belated action in reassessing the Greek 
sovereign debts on their balance sheet. The Greek crisis started with the 
announcement of the upwards amendment of the fiscal deficit in 5th 
November 2009; the banks did not react by amending their financial 
statements until late 2010-early 2011. Why did it take that long to reassess 
the risk on their balance sheet? In truth, bad news travels slowly, simply 
put it is hard to accept bad news. Theoretically, market participants tend to 
deploy over-optimism or wishful thinking inthe belief that positive results 
can still be possible. Hence, as stated by Barberis & Thaler, (2003), cognitive 
conservatism underweights any new information contradicting an earlier 
positive view. Moreover, since market participants are bynature loss avert, 
therefore mentally, they are discouraged from admitting failure. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Kahneman & Tversky, (1979), market 
participants may take higher risks to avoid or postpone loss.  
As identified by Szyszka, (2013), the influence of external players, such 
as hedge funds and rating agencies, during the euro crises, cannot be 
underestimated. Among the strategies hedge funds use are short-selling 
and hedging by buying derivatives such as CDS. Simply put short selling is 
a strategy whereby the hedge fund bets on the price of an asset falling, 
hence the strategy illustrated by Figure 1. Another strategy often used by 
hedge funds is hedging against a country or organisation by buying a 
derivative, often Credit Default Swap, against the possibility of a default.  
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Figure 1. Short-selling strategy 
 
EU and national politicians blamed these two strategies during the euro 
crises for intensifying the crisis. A key behavioural factor underpinning 
these hedge funds strategies is herding, essentially herding is where market 
participants reactto information or event in a similar way. Thehedge funds 
often used this strategyto bet on a fall in the euro against the dollar and 
Greek default during the euro crises.  
As indicated by Szyszka, (2013), the second relevant players during the 
euro crises were the rating agencies who were partly to blame for the global 
financial crisis as highlighted previously. During the euro crises, it was a 
case of belated action followed by a quick reaction. The failure to recognise 
the risk disparity among the EU members gave rise to countries with weak 
macroeconomics factors being given the same triple-A rating as Germany, 
essentially Spain and Ireland. Furthermore, Greek sovereign debt ratings as 
investment grade even though macroeconomic factors pointed towards a 
downgrading were instrumental in market participants' continued 
investment. Additionally, the credit rating agencies only acted long after 
the markets classed the Greek yields as junk. Nevertheless, the rating 
agencies overreacted in the Portuguese and Irish sovereign debts 
downgrading, even though both countries have agreed to undertake IMF 
restructuring programs and their economies were in better health than the 
Greek. 
On 23rd June 2016, the UK voted in the referendum to leave the European 
Union by 51.89% to 48.11%. The results signalled the start of the so-called 
Brexit process whereby negotiations over the UK's withdrawal from the EU 
could start. This process was initiated by the UK’s government on 29th 
March 2017 when they invoked Article 50 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which 
sets out the guidelines and conditions of a member state withdrawal from 
the EU. In terms of the financial markets, Brexit was a lesson in market 
participants' reaction to news and miscommunication by politicians. As 
highlighted by Fakhry, (2019b), except for Finland, on 24th June 2016 the 
losses on the Eurozone stock markets were higher than 5% averaging 
8.17%. In the UK, the FTSE 100 loss 5.62% of its value.  
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There were some behavioural traits at play during the Brexit process. As 
observed previously, market participants tend to extrapolate events into 
the future. During the referendum and Brexit processes, there was a sense 
that market participants were not only extrapolating vertically but also 
horizontally. Indeed, there was an element of vertical extrapolation 
analysis of the economic consequences of Brexit in the UK. This analysis 
was bought about because market participants did not have any 
comparable eventto base their perception, which led to a highly volatile 
and uncertain market. A possible explanation is that market participants 
exhibited ambiguity aversion. As pointed by Ellsberg, (1961), market 
participants become increasingly ambiguity averse during any situation 
where the information's quality or confidence levels are unknown. Another 
explanation is the availability bias; market participants did not have any 
comparable situations; this caused them to link Brexit to the recent euro 
crises. At the heart of the market participants’ fear of Brexit lays a 
fundamental truth in that humans fear any social signals as hinted by 
Zweig, (2010). Thus, meaning any media communication affecting the 
financial market in any way leads to a reaction from the market 
participants. Since mixed news and political communications about 
Brexitwas plentiful, market participants’ perception was negative. Another 
critical factor is that Brexit was an emotionally charged event which 
triggered a snowball effect on the financial market, causing a loss of 
confidence as suggested by Zweig, (2010).  
The basis for horizontal extrapolation wasthe fear that the UK would 
signal others to follow suit and exit the EU and particularly the Eurozone. 
This situation would have had a ripple effecton the integration process, as 
highlighted previously and led to uncertainty in the integrated financial 
market of the EU. Particularly the Eurozone, as many member nations were 
growing disincentivised with the whole EU integrative process (e.g. Italy, 
France and Holland). The prolonged and complicated process of Brexit is 
partly down to the fact that the EU does not want to give too many 
concessions to the UK, in the process illustrating that a life outside the EU 
could be worth considering.  
 
3. Methodology 
The crises have highlighted the importance of a stable financial market 
underpinning the EU integration process. Several pieces of research had 
been conducted over the past few years emphasising this issue Groba, 
Lafuente & Serrano, (2013), MacDonald, Sogiakas & Tsopanakis, (2018), 
Trabelsi & Hmida, (2018) and Fakhry, (2019b) to name but a few. In 
analysing the efficiency of a number of the most affected Eurozone 
financial markets during the recent crises, Fakhry & Richter, (2016) and 
Fakhry, Masood & Bellalah, (2017)  found that in general, the financial 
markets were unstable. As hinted by Fakhry, (2019b), there is a strong 
linkage between financial markets integration and stability. Indeed, the 
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thinking behind the Stability and Growth Pact and mandate of the ECB 
were partly to keep market stability.  
Theoretically, if a market is unstable, it is regarded as reactive, as 
indicated by behavioural finance. Moreover, as put by Bernard Baruch Lee, 
Jiang & Indro, (2002:2277): 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events 
themselves but the human reactions to those events.” 
As hinted by Barberis, (2013), Szyszka, (2010), Szyszka, (2013) and 
Masood et al., (2017) among many, the reaction of market participants tend 
to deviate between overreaction and underreaction. Indeed, during the 
crises, there was a hint of both reactive trends in the Eurozone financial 
markets as alluded previously. 
A critical factor in our research is the shifts in volatility regimes, this 
phenomenon has been the subject of many pieces of research, mainly in the 
FX markets, over the years: Haas, Mittnik & Paolella, (2004), Kanas, (2005), 
Brunetti et al., (2008), Chakrabart & Sen, (2011), Beg & Anwar, (2012) and 
Chortareas, & Jiang, (2017). The EMU effect on regime shifting has only 
been the subject of a relatively few number of researches: Frommel, (2004), 
Frommel, (2006), Wilfling, (2001) and Wilfling, (2009) to name a few. We 
use a Markov Switching GARCH model to analyse the shift in reactive 
behaviour in the Euro FX markets since as suggested by Fakhry, (2018), it is 
possible to model the shift between overreaction and underreaction 
regimes by using the Markov Switching GARCH model. 
 
3.1. The market stability hypothesis model specification 
As alluded by Fakhry, (2018), the simple statement underpinning our 
hypothesis is that any financial market's stability depends on the market 
participants' reaction during any period. This point crucially underpins 
every factor in the global financial markets and decisions by monetary 
policymakers. Moreover, here is the critical factor during any period there 
is a mixture of highly volatile sub-periods hinting at overreaction and 
highly stable sub-periods hinting at underreaction. However, for any 
observed period, the market should stabilize if the reactions balanced out. 
Essentially, this means that the overreaction and underreaction cancel out; 
hence the sub-periods of high and low volatility deviates towards zero. 
This ideology is the essence of our hypothesis; the model suggests that the 
markets stabilize as the reaction approaches zero.   
 
𝑅𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑂,𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝑈,𝑇 → 0 
Condition 1:𝑅𝑆𝑇 ≫ 0, an overreaction 
Condition 2: 𝑅𝑆𝑇 ≪ 0, an underreaction     (1) 
 
However, if the null hypothesis is correct, the market participants react 
to the news or event in ways that do not agree with our market stability 
hypothesis. Primarily the market participants exhibit either overreaction or 
underreaction towards the news or event; this is where our model differs 
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from any previous model. Since, Equation 1 states that reaction at time T, 
RST , is the difference between the overreaction at T, SSO,T , and the 
underreaction, SSU,T , during any observed period. Hence, in a null 
hypothesis, Condition 1 and Condition 2 should illustrate market 











𝑆𝐷 𝑣𝑎𝑟  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   
≤ 𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡      (2) 
 
Primarily, our model's simple top-level equation is the variance bound 
test introduced by Fakhry & Richter, (2015). We derived both our 
independent variables 𝑆𝑆𝑂,𝑇  and 𝑆𝑆𝑈,𝑇  from the variance bound test in 
Equation 1 and Equation 2 is a hypothesis suggesting the null hypothesis of 
each stable status, where 𝑆𝑆𝑂,𝑇 > 𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡  and 𝑆𝑆𝑈,𝑇 > 𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡 , essentially 
means the market is volatile and hence inefficient. However, at the heart of 
the equation is the summation    𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 𝐻𝐿
   whereby the 
coefficients the high or low volatility are summed. As with Fakhry & 
Richter, (2015), we follow the first pre-requisite step advocated by Shiller, 
(1981). 
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→𝑇 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =




       (3) 
 
However, since we are only concerned with the market's stability and 
reaction to news and events; we do not follow the second step as described 
by Fakhry & Richter, (2015) and advocated by Shiller, (1981). This change 
was partly due to the estimation of the model underpinning the 
coefficients, but mainly because we deemed it unnecessary Fakhry, (2019b).  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑆𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝜇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   where 𝑆𝑡 =  
0 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒
1 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 
   (4) 
 
𝑃 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑡−1 =  
𝑝00 𝑝10
𝑝01 𝑝11
       (5) 
 
The model underpinning our coefficients is any variant of the Markov 
switching GARCH model. In essence, the Markov switching GARCH 
model is an extension of the Markov switching model introduced by 
Hamilton, (1989) and Hamilton, (1990). As illustrated by Hamilton, (1989), 
severalresearchers have pointed to a weakness in analysing economic data 
and business cycles in a stationary linear data set. This issue pointed to a 
changing environment in the underlining economic trend which a non-
stationary regime-switching model using a discrete-state Markov process 
could pick up. As stated in Equation 4, the model specifies that the 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑡  is regime dependence on the mean with probabilities 
of Equation 5 of a transition between regime 1 and 2. 
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𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑝𝜀𝑡−1
2          (6) 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑝𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜉𝑑𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1





      (7) 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝜀𝑡−1
2          (8) 
 
However, as stated by Hamilton & Susmel, (1994) and Cai, (1994) 
amongst others, financial markets often interchanged between periods of 
low and high volatility. Furthermore, as argued by Hamilton & Susmel, 
(1994), the importance of this is two folds, on the one hand, the risk 
determines the price of any financial asset or index; on the other hand, the 
conditional mean of econometric models depend on the correct conditional 
variance. Conversely, due to issues regarding path dependence in Markov 
Switching GARCH arising from the literal translation of Bollerslev, (1986) 
GARCH model. Thus meaning the models of Hamilton & Susmel, (1994) 
and Cai, (1994) were base on the ARCH model of volatility of  Engle, (1982) 
given by Equation 6. In essence, both Hamilton & Susmel, (1994) and Cai, 
(1994) were variant of the SWARCH model illustrated by Equation 7 and 
Equation 8, respectively.   
 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑕𝑡−1 where 𝑘 = 𝜀
2 and 𝑕 = 𝜎2     (9) 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑆𝑡𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑕𝑡−1 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑆𝑡𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑕𝑡−1 : 𝑕𝑡−1 = 𝜉
 
𝑡−1 𝑡−2  𝑕𝑡−1    (10) 
where  𝑕𝑡 =  𝜔0 + 𝛼0𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽0𝑕𝑡−1 ,… ,𝜔𝑆−1 + 𝛼𝑆−1𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑆−1𝑕𝑡−1   (11) 
 
As noted by Haas, Mittnik & Paolella, (2004), GARCH models provide a 
better description of volatility than ARCH models. Further, ARCH models 
contain only part of the information on volatility, the impact of news or 
new information on the volatility captured by α. In reality, the persistence 
of volatility is the other vital information captured by β in the GARCH 
model illustrated by Equation 9. Conversely, a direct substitution would 
seem to be the answer; however consider Equation 10, 𝑕𝑡  would depend on 
the entire regime history, which would render direct estimation virtually 
impossible. A possible method of implementing an MS-GARCH model was 
introduced by Gray, (1996) as illustrated by Equation 11. Klaassen, (2002) 
argued it would be more convenient to use 𝑕𝑡−1 = 𝜉 𝑡−1 𝑡−1  𝑕𝑡−1 instead of 
𝑕𝑡−1 = 𝜉 𝑡−1 𝑡−2  𝑕𝑡−1as used in Gray, (1996). 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑕𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡
1
2𝜖𝑡 , 𝜖𝑡~𝑁 0,1  
𝑕𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡 = 𝜔𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑆𝑡𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑕𝑡−1,𝑆𝑡        (12) 
where 𝑘 = 𝜀𝑡
2  and 𝑆𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑆 − 1 
 
We use a much more efficient and powerful MS-GARCH model derived 
by Haas, Mittnik & Paolella, (2004) as illustrated in Equation 12. 
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Conversely, this means that each GARCH regime can be recursively 
updated; moreover, the GARCH regime only depends on the previous 
period’s volatility and residual information. Additionally, the GARCH 
structure may be evaluated before the Markov-Switching filter. 
 
4. Data description 
This paper analyses the Euro FX market's stability and reactionfrom its 
introduction on 1st January 1999 to 31st December 2019. We obtain the 
dataset from the Bank for International Settlements (aka BIS) using the 
Nominal Broad Effective Exchange Rate (aka NBEER) index.  The NBEER is 
an index of weighted averaged bilateral exchange rates from 27 economies. 
We observed the market on a 5-day week basis and filled any missing data 
with the previously known data, therefore using a total observation of 5,478 
daily data.  
 
5. Empirical evidence 
The keys to the stability statistics and hencethe reaction of the markets in 
our test lay in the MS-GARCH model's coefficients and standard deviation 
of the observed datasets As suggested earlier; we use the Haas, Mittnik & 
Paolella, (2004) variant of the MS-GARCH model. In estimating the model, 
we used OxMetrics 8.0 with the standard defaults’ options. The system was 
a Windows 10 on a ten core CPU with 32Gbytes of RAM computer.  
We observed three critical periods in the European integration process: 
theEuro's introduction, the crises period, which started with the global 
financial crises and ended with the Eurozone sovereign debt crises, and 
finally Brexit. All three are critical periods on the road of European 
integration for different reasons. The introduction of the Euro, although a 
compromised concept with some glaring omissionfactors; yet the euphoria 
and optimism surrounding the introduction led to a strong belief in the 
integration process. The crises started with a denial that the global financial 
crises would impact the financial system in the EU and continued with a 
near-collapse of the Eurozone with the sovereign debt crises. However, it 
ended with possible further integration of the Eurozone. In a way, the real 
impact of Brexit is still on-going, but Brexit illustrated the potential for a 
partial disintegration of the EU led by forces of populist and nationalist 
uprising. The outcome was eagerly watched by other potential member 
states and political parties wishing to break out of the EU integration 
process; like Italy, the Netherland and France. 
 
5.1. The introduction and aftermath of the Euro 
As illustrated by Cohen, (2003), the euro was born to a much euphoria 
environment. Indeed many in the market and academic predicted the euro 
would challenge the US dollar for global FX supremacy; relatively few 
questioned the enthusiasm towards the euro such as Feldstein, (1997). 
Conversely, Papaioannou, Portes & Siourounis, (2006) found that the euro's 
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influence as the reference international reserve currency in the central 
banking environment was growing and accordingly “punching above its 
weight”. However, as highlighted earlier, the EMU was a compromised 
integrative policy with glaring omissions. 
Moreover, as hinted by Trichet, (2001) and Galati & Tsatsaronis, (2003), 
there were still some issues regarding the EMU that meant the full potential 
for financial market integration mightremain unrealised. Nevertheless, this 
did not prevent the Eurozone from enjoying a prolonged period of 
economic and financial upturn. Furthermore, the financial markets, such as 
the equity and to a lesser extent bond markets, were being integrated. 
According to Trichet, (2001), generally, the Eurozone financial markets 
grew in the aftermath of the introduction of the euro.  
As illustrated previously and by Szyszka, (2013), this general upturn in 
the Eurozone economies gave rise to a blinded greed in some member 
states on all three macroeconomic levels: governments, market participants 
and consumers. Thus, highlighting extrapolating errors and short-termism 
behavioural traits, It seems that the advanced of the EMU and Euro created 
a false sense of stability and economic growth that all three levels of 
macroeconomics extrapolated further into the future. This falsified sense 
inevitably led to the underpricing of risk and overconfident, thus missing 
or misjudging certain warning signs.  
As described in Table 2, the estimated model has a significant news 
coefficient, α, for both high and low volatility regimes signifying the impact 
of news or information during this period. However, the high volatility 
regime's coefficient is substantially high, indicating that news or 
information had a massive effect on the high volatility regime. Not 
surprisingly then that the persistent coefficient, β, is insignificant on both 
regimes. Indeed, the statistics is hinting at a zero-volatility persistent on the 
high volatility regime. The probability statistics, P{0,0} and P{1,1}, of the 
regime not changing are significant. Moreover, the low volatility regime's 
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Both stable statistics point to a highly volatile Euro FX market during 
this period as illustrated by the S-stats. Nevertheless, the evidence from the 
R-stat is that the market is only slightly overreactive.  Thus, pointing to the 
reaction to information or news generally being within the bounds of 
rationality in the Euro FX market during this period. 






























log-likelihood 3.218E+03 3.244E+03 2.026E+03
AIC -2.915E+00 -2.739E+00 -4.385E+00
Linearity 2.183E+03 4.318E+03 7.953E+02
Normality 4.775E+02 6.615E+02 2.068E+01
ARCH 7.595E-01 3.943E-02 1.036E+00
Autocorrelation 2.443E+02 2.669E+02 8.091E+01
Mean 0.123247 0.14575 0.0557982
Std Dev 0.145216 0.269079 0.0618362
S-stat(r-0) 3.6136314 1.7036038 -2.5277055
S-stat(r-1) 3.167849961 2.28033217 8.296238449
Stabilty(r-0) Volatle Stable Volatle
Stabilty(r=1) Volatile Volatile Volatile
R-stat 0.4457815 -0.5767284 -5.7685330
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5.2. The global financial and Eurozone crises 
In essence, as illustrated earlier and by Schimmelfennig, (2017), 
Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, (2018) and Hooghe & Marks, (2019); both crises 
had their roots in the incomplete and compromised integration process of 
the EMU and Euro. As hinted by Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), the 
lack of a genuinely integrative Eurozone broad regulation for an increasing 
European banking system and financial market played a significant part in 
the global financial crisis in the Eurozone. Moreover, as pointed by Jones, 
Kelemen & Meunier, (2016), another issue was the lack of an integrated 
fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment policies to deal with a Eurozone 
macroeconomic recession and crisis. Further, as highlighted by Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, (2018), the lack of tools and restricted mandate for the ECB to 
act in the crises. These issues meant added to the fact that many in the 
European Union were in denial about the global financial crisis and 
thought that it was an American problem meant the actions of the EU were 
often too late and in the words of Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, (2012) 
characterised by the “chicken game”. 
As illustrated previously and by Szyszka, (2013), there are several 
behavioural traits in explaining the crises. The first is the 
human/macroeconomic time-horizon conflict Kahneman & Tversky, (1979). 
Humans act on short time-horizons focusing on the immediate fear of 
losses; while macroeconomics works on longer time horizons. The second 
is the underpricing/underestimation of risk, which hints at greed by 
governments and market participants. The third trait is the Euro heuristics 
as explained earlier and derived by Szyszka, (2013), this is the tendency to 
group all EMU member states under the same label. A key factor 
influencing the euro crises was the rather belated actions of market 
participants, particularly the European banks, in reassessing their 
portfolios and balance sheets. The explanation is that it is hard to accept 
bad news, and hence bad news travels slowly. As Kahneman & Tversky, 
(1979) argue that market participants tend to avoid or postpone losses. 
Table 2 is hinting at a significant news coefficient on both regimes 
during the crises period. Conversely, the low volatility regime's news 
coefficient was the higher of the two regimes during the crises hinting at 
approximately three times the impact. Although both persistent coefficients 
are insignificant, yet the high volatility regime is persistent, it is the highest 
of the three sub-periods. The probability statistics illustrate the regimes' 
differences with the low volatility regime being more significant than the 
high volatility regime. 
There is a difference in the Euro FX market's stability status with the 
high volatility regime hinting a stable market while the low volatility 
regime isindicatinga volatile market. Moreover, the crises period 
highlighted a slight underreaction as implied by the R-stat, meaning that 
the reaction to news or information during the crises was within the 
bounds of rationality. Remember that the Euro did not suffer any 
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significant impact or runs on it during the crises, unlike the other markets 
within the Eurozone.   
 
5.3. The Brexit impact 
As stated by Schimmelfennig, (2018a) and Schimmelfennig, (2018b), the 
issues at the heart of Brexit were politicisation and bargaining. The 
politicisation of Brexit helped shift the emphasis froma few interest groups 
to the mass population where political identity plays a more significant 
role. Given the increasing eurosceptic population due to the loss of national 
identity and depth of integration, politicisation was an influencing factor. 
As illustrated by Schimmelfennig, (2018b), the critical factor in the 
intergovernmental bargaining with the two sides' initial position. The EU 
wanted to protect the integrity of the EU and euro while discouraging any 
further disintegration. The UK wanted to leave the EU while protecting 
their services and goods trades with the EU. Eventually, the UK and EU 
agreed to a withdrawal agreement on 22nd October 2019 approximately 40 
months after the UK voted to withdraw from the EU. The EU and UK still 
have to agree on the nature of a trade relationship which as things stand, if 
a deal is not reached by 31st December 2020 then the UK could still leave in 
2021 without a trade deal. Remember as highlighted by Fakhry, (2019a), the 
economic impact of Brexit is likely to be more significant on the UK than 
the EU and Eurozone. However, just how much of an impact is open to 
debate and depends on the economic deal, if any, within 2021.  
The critical factor to remember during Brexit is the impact of 
information or lack thereof; two behavioural traits can influence this. The 
first is, as pointed by Ellsberg, (1961),  the ambiguity bias which states that 
market participants tend to exhibit increasing ambiguity aversion when the 
quality or confidence levels of the information is unknown. The second is 
the availability bias which dictates that market participants tend to react 
differently to the lack of information or comparable event. The lack of 
information about Brexit may have triggered an association with the euro 
crises, as explained previously. Furthermore, as hinted by Zweig, (2010), 
humans fear any social signal; thus meaning market participants 
perception of any political communication or news regarding Brexit or the 
process was negative. There is another factor as suggested by Zweig, 
(2010), since Brexit was emotionally charged on all sides, thus triggering a 
snowball effect into the financial market. The final factor is horizontal 
extrapolation by market participants based on the fear that the UK could 
signal other countries to exit the EU and particularly the Eurozone with 
noises from Italy, France and Holland. Therefore, causing a domino effect 
ending with the euro being abandoned. 
Table 2 seems to be hinting at a split in the impact of news or 
information during the Brexit period. The high volatility regime is hinting 
at a near-zero impact on the Euro FX market, while the low volatility 
regime points at a significant impact. Thus, mainly due to the impact of 
news and information from Brexit falling mostly on the UK Sterling FX 
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market. Both persistent volatility coefficients are insignificant, even though 
the low volatility regime is nearly double the high volatility regime's 
persistence. The probabilities are slightly lower than the crises period 
range, hinting at the low volatility regime being more highly likely.  
  The stability stats of both regimes are indicating a highly volatile 
market during the Brexit negotiation period. However, the low volatility 
regime seems to be more highly volatile. Moreover, the R-stats seem to be 
indicating a significant high underreaction in the Euro FX market.  The 
crucial clue is the euro, remember as stated previously, the significant 
impact of Brexit fell on the UK Sterling FX market.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In summarising, this research combines the three European integration 
theories with behavioural finance to give a full picture of the Eurozone 
crises and Brexit. In order to understand the whole picture influencing any 
event and not just the EUcrises, it is necessary to include the action of both 
the governing organisation, in this case, the EU, and the market 
participants. Only when taking account of this factor, a full grasp of the 
feedback effect between the actions or inaction of both the EU and market 
participants can be appreciated. The issues were two folds: 
 the EU was too reactive and sensitive to the markets, and thus their 
actions did not resolve the problems at the heart of the crises 
 the techniques used by market participants bore the wholemark of 
the opposite scale behaviours: greed and fear 
Further, market participants extrapolated information vertically thru 
time horizons and horizontally thru markets orEU member states which 
led to false information resulting in bad investments decisions. At the heart 
of the issues with both the EU and market participants was the euro 
heuristic which, as identified by Szyszka, (2013),  is the willingness by 
market participants to put all Eurozone members states in the same boat 
marked euro. Likewise, the euro heuristic influenced the EU actions, where 
a misconception grew with the euro regarding the stability and strength of 
the Eurozone economy. This factor led to the EU underreacting on the 
global financial and Eurozone sovereign debt crises 
We also introduced a newmodel of testing any market's stability using 
the variance bound test of Fakhry & Richter, (2015) underpinned by a 
Markov Switching GARCH. We used the MS-GARCH model of Haas, 
Mittnik & Paolella, (2004); however, any MS-GARCH model would work 
with our new market stability test. The test modelled the critical 
behavioural factors influencing the reaction of market participants: 
underreactions and overreactions. The results seem to point to a slight 
overreaction in the Euro FX market to the introduction of the euro. 
However, during the crises period and, particularly the Brexit period, the 
result suggests an underreaction. 
Furthermore, whereas with the crises period, there was a slight 
underreaction, the Brexit period seem to hint at a significant underreaction. 
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Given the impression of the euro within these different observational 
periods, the results seem to be a full reflection of the times. However, 
further research is required on other markets to test whether our model 
does truly convey market participants' reaction during uncertain events 
such as the recent crises or Brexit. A possible second route for further 
research is the MS-EGARCH model derived by Henry, (2009) to analyse the 
asymmetrical effect on the stability and reaction. 
In concluding, it is hard to overestimate the feedback effect in the 
reactions of the market participant and EU during the recent crises and to a 
lesser extent Brexit. The lack of a uniformed plan and miscommunication 
from the EU during the crises or the British government during Brexit gave 
rise to unstable markets. Since market participants are homo sapiens and 
not homo economicus or Econ, hence as elegantly put by Bernard Baruch 
and Bertrand Russell: 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events themselves 
but the humans' reactions to those events.”  
“Neither man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanly or 
think slowly under the influence of fear.” 
The second quote can be extended to explain the EU's reactions during 
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